Date:Thu, 5 Feb 2009 10:57:23 +0200
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Subject:Zisser in MEQ: "Nasrallah's Defeat in the 2006 War"
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For years, it has been customary to view Hasan
Nasrallah as one of the canniest players in the
Middle East. Under his leadership, Hezbollah
achieved major successes and established itself
as the leader of the Lebanese Shi‘i community and
as the most capable terrorist group threatening
Israel. Nasrallah became a respected leader not
only to many Lebanese Shi‘a but also to Arabs and
Muslims far beyond Lebanon's borders. However,
Hizballah's defeat in the 2006 war with Israel
placed Nasrallah in a difficult situation. Dayan
Center Director Prof. Eyal Zisser analyzes the
challenge facing now both Nasrallah and the
Lebanese state as a whole in the latest issue of Middle East Quarterly
Nasrallah's Defeat in the 2006 War
Assessing Hezbollah's Influence
Eyal Zisser
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2009
<http://www.meforum.org/article/2054>http://www.meforum.org/article/2054
On the night of February 12, 2008, a car bomb in
Damascus killed Imad Mughniyeh, the head of
Hezbollah's military wing. The assassination
shattered the legend of Hezbollah's
invincibility. Intelligence services of at least
forty countries had pursued Mughniyeh for
decades, and he had succeeded in evading them
all. His elusiveness substantiated Hezbollah's
claim that its enemies had no hope of finding
cracks in the group's network or in the ranks of
its faithful. Mughniyeh's death destroyed that
myth. Since that fateful Tuesday, every child in
Lebanon knows that whoever got Mughniyeh will be
able to get to Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's secretary-general, as well.
At Mughniyeh's Beirut funeral, Nasrallah blamed
Israel for the assassination and said the group's
revenge would not be slow in coming.[1] His
emotive response is understandable. Not only was
Mughniyeh's death a severe blow to Hezbollah—he
was the group's terror mastermind and chief
military strategist—but the shattering of the
legend of Mughniyeh also lowered Hezbollah's standing and morale.
Nasrallah in a Tight Spot
For years, it has been customary to view
Nasrallah as one of the canniest players in the
Middle East. Under his leadership, Hezbollah
achieved major successes and established itself
as the leader of the Lebanese Shi‘i community and
as the most capable terrorist group threatening
Israel. Nasrallah became a respected leader not
only to many Lebanese Shi‘a but also to Arabs and
Muslims far beyond Lebanon's borders.
Nasrallah built Hezbollah into an organization
standing on two pillars. One pillar is its
powerful, armed militia that focuses on the
struggle with Israel, and the other is the
organization's political and social activities,
which aim to improve the lot of the Lebanese
Shi‘a and, eventually, challenge the existing
order in the country on behalf of the Shi‘i
community. During the 1990s, Hezbollah became the
leading power among the Lebanese Shi‘a, eclipsing
the Amal movement thanks to the social, economic,
and political infrastructure Hezbollah had
developed. Election results to the Lebanese
parliament and the local municipalities
demonstrate this superiority. Since 2000, many in
Lebanon and abroad have begun to suspect that
Nasrallah seeks to take power in Lebanon by
democratic means, exploiting the fact that his
Shi‘i supporters constitute the largest community
in the country, perhaps 35 to 45 percent of the
total population.[2] Indeed, following the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Nasrallah began
calling for the implementation in Lebanon of a
democratic system such as the Americans had brought to Iraq.[3]
Despite his shrewdness, Nasrallah has been a
compulsive gambler for whom only one step
separates success from catastrophe. For many
years, he won, but in the summer of 2006, his
winning streak was broken. First, he kidnapped
two Israeli soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud
Goldwasser, sparking war with Israel; second, he
chose after that war to challenge the Lebanese
government of Fouad Siniora, plunging Lebanon
into a long crisis and Hezbollah into the murky waters of Lebanese politics.
Nasrallah's gambles have transformed Hezbollah's
identity and standing. The group gained the
respect of many Lebanese, Arabs, and Muslims as
it acquired the sheen of victory as a resistance
movement. Now, however dominant Hezbollah is, it
is developing into just another Lebanese
political party, corrupted by its participation
in day-to-day politics. Yet inside Lebanon, its
record includes the terrible destruction it
brought on the country through its unilateral
actions. Worse, it is viewed increasingly as a
narrowly-focused Shi‘i force serving as a tool,
if not a fifth column, of Iran with the aim of
advancing a host of Iranian interests—inside
Lebanon, against Israel, and across the Sunni divide.[4]
Two years after Hezbollah's war with Israel,
Lebanon is a divided country teetering on the
verge of a civil war that is largely a result of
Hezbollah's bellicosity toward Israel and its
refusal to submit itself to the domain of
politics with the rest of Lebanon. Hezbollah
itself is a battered and bruised organization
struggling to regain its standing inside Lebanon.
Meanwhile, two other realities are indisputable:
First, since the 2006 war, quiet has prevailed
along the Israeli-Lebanese border such as has not
been known there since the late 1960s, prior to
the arrival of Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) forces in Lebanon. This quiet derives above
all from Hezbollah's wariness of Israel. The
organization is concerned that it and its
supporters will not be able to withstand the
strain of a new round of fighting. The second
reality is Nasrallah's disappearance from public
events. Prior to the 2006 war, it was customary
for him to participate monthly in more than dozen
meetings. For example, in October and November
2005, Al-Manar television and the Lebanese
National News Agency reported twenty-eight public
meetings, speeches, or media events. His need to
remain hidden is a blow to someone who depends on
frequent public exposure, and it reinforces the
perception of Hezbollah's vulnerability to
assassination and sabotage. Indeed, rumors are
rife of Iranian dissatisfaction with Nasrallah.
On the eve of Mughniyeh's assassination, reports
circulated that Tehran had supplanted Nasrallah's
leadership with his deputy leader Na‘im Qasim.[5]
While both Nasrallah and Qasim denied the
reports,[6] Iranian disappointment with
Nasrallah's conduct during and after the 2006
Israel-Hezbollah war and its belief that
Nasrallah endangered Iranian interests by his
uncalculated behavior has been evident in many
reports in both the Lebanese and Arab media.[7]
From Victory to Defeat
In May 2000, Hezbollah reached the highest peak
of its existence. On the night of May 24, 2000,
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) completed its
retreat from the so-called security zone in
southern Lebanon, a unilateral withdrawal
undertaken without any agreements or commitments
with the other side. For Hezbollah, this became
both a great victory and a day of celebration.
The IDF retreat from southern Lebanon gave
Hezbollah new prestige. The organization was now
viewed as the vanguard of the Arab struggle
against Israel and as a rising force with a
promising future both inside Lebanon and abroad.
It was assumed that Hezbollah was destined to
play a significant regional role, especially in
view of the political and even ideological vacuum
that characterized inter-Arab relations. In
Israel, there were even some people who expressed
concern that Nasrallah had his sights set on
becoming a pan-Arab leader of the stature of Gamal Abdul Nasser.[8]
In October 2000, months after the Israeli
withdrawal, Hezbollah renewed its attacks on
Israeli targets, mainly in the Shebaa Farms
region at the foot of Mount Hermon. With Iranian
and Syrian help, Hezbollah had developed an
impressive military capability that included an
arsenal of 12,000 missiles with ranges covering
all of northern Israel to Hadera. Hezbollah soon
began to encourage and assist terrorist
activities carried out by Palestinian organizations against Israel.[9]
Nasrallah has headed the Hezbollah organization
since February 1992. His achievements stem both
from political astuteness and his deep
understanding of the strategic realities of the
region. However, Nasrallah's hubris leads him to
mistakes. Whatever successes he achieves
encourage him to take more gambles. And like any gambler, he eventually lost.
On the morning of July 12, 2006, Hezbollah
fighters attacked an IDF patrol moving along the
Israeli-Lebanese border. Nasrallah later admitted
that he had thought at the time that the Israeli
response would be minor, localized, and limited,
like past Israeli reactions to similar Hezbollah
provocations.[10] Instead, the government of
Israel launched an all-out war against Hezbollah.
The war lasted thirty-three days and brought ruin
and destruction not witnessed since the end of
the Lebanese civil war (1975-90) on the Lebanese
side of the border, from the towns and villages
in the south to the Shi‘i suburbs of Beirut. The
fighting killed close to 1,300 Lebanese
civilians, together with perhaps 600 Hezbollah
fighters. Nearly a million Lebanese became
refugees, including most of the Shi‘i population of southern Lebanon.[11]
As the war ended, Nasrallah declared that
Hezbollah had won a "divine victory."[12] After
all, Hezbollah had survived the Israeli assault
and had quite a few successes in the fighting
such as striking Haifa for the first time since
1948,[13] as well as hitting the Israeli military
vessel, Hanit, off the Beirut shore on the
evening of July 14, 2006.[14] However, the gains
did not outnumber the losses. Hezbollah suffered
severe blows during the fighting, hence
Nasrallah's admission that if he realized there
was even a one percent chance of a sustained
military response from Israel, he would not have
given orders to kidnap the Israeli soldiers.[15]
In Israel as well as in the West, Nasrallah is
too often perceived only as the leader of a
terrorist militia with several thousand fighters
and rockets that seeks confrontation with Israel.
Those who look at Nasrallah through that narrow
prism believe that, as Nasrallah continued firing
rockets into Israel until the last day of the
fighting, he could legitimately be seen as the victor in the confrontation.
However, Nasrallah does not simply see himself as
the leader of an army. In both his own eyes and
those of his followers, he was a symbol for the
entire Arab if not Muslim world.[16] As of July
11, 2006, he was the leader of a political and
social movement—probably the largest in
Lebanon—with deep roots in the Lebanese Shi‘i
community. Hezbollah had fourteen representatives
in the parliament, more than four thousand
representatives in local municipal councils, an
education system with dozens of schools and about
one hundred thousand students, a health system
with dozens of hospitals and clinics caring for
half a million people a year, a banking system,
marketing chains, and even pension funds and
insurance companies. Nasrallah has devoted much
of his energy in the last decade to building up
his movement, or domestic empire, as it were. He
viewed the creation of such an empire as his
life's work, which would take him far, possibly
even to a contest over the control of Lebanon.[17]
But, Israel set back Nasrallah's efforts.
Hezbollah suffered perhaps US$4 billion damage to
its institutions and enterprises while the damage
caused to Lebanon was perhaps five times
more.[18] Despite such a result, Lebanese Shi‘a
had no choice but to rally around Nasrallah.
There was no one else in Lebanon let alone at the
U.N. or in the international community who cared
about them. Communal Lebanese government leaders
focused on the interests of the Sunni, Maronite,
and Druze communities even though these
communities barely suffered in the war. However,
the damage inflicted on the Shi‘a clearly reduced
Nasrallah's room for maneuver, as evidenced by
his admission at the end of the war.[19]
As the weeks and months passed, the degree of
damage inflicted on the organization's military
power also became clear. It was just as painful
and significant as the damage done to the
organization's political power. First, Israeli
forces destroyed Hezbollah's stockpile of
strategic missiles, primarily Zilzal unguided
rockets from Iran, during the first moments of
the Israeli attack on the night of July 12, 2007.
Nasrallah had hoped to use these missiles against
central Israel. This was a severe blow to the
Hezbollah leader, who lost an important
bargaining chip even before the campaign began.
Indeed, the precision of Israeli intelligence,
which enabled Jerusalem to strike at the
organization's strategic stockpile, surprised Nasrallah.[20]
Second, Israeli assessments estimate that
Hezbollah lost about a third of its elite
fighting force. While Hezbollah has no difficulty
attracting volunteers to its ranks, turning them
into skilled military operators is a lengthy and
complex process.[21] Third, despite the mistakes
made by the IDF in conducting the military
campaign, Israeli soldiers triumphed in every
face-to-face battle with Hezbollah.[22]
Nasrallah concealed these facts from the Lebanese
people and perhaps even from Iran. Hezbollah fed
reports of successes and victories to both
audiences.[23] Despite the false reports,
however, Tehran likely realized the scope of
disaster Hezbollah had suffered, and there is no
doubt that Nasrallah himself grasped the extent
of the damage that had been done to his organization and himself.
In the wake of the 2006 war, the following facts
have become clear: First, Hezbollah, which
represented itself as the "defender of Lebanon,"
turned out to be its destroyer, due to the
extensive devastation it brought down on the
heads of the Lebanese people in the course of the
war. Second, Hezbollah's deterrent charm was
dispelled. The war made it clear that the
organization could no longer carry out military
operations against Israel along the
Lebanese-Israeli border and expect Israel to
refrain from retaliating. Third, Hezbollah was
perceived more and more as a Shi‘i organization serving Iranian interests.
Thus, there is nothing surprising in the fact
that since the war, Nasrallah has devoted himself
to repairing and rebuilding his power while, at
the same time, taking greater care than ever
before to preserve the quiet along the
Lebanese-Israeli border. He has no desire to
rekindle the confrontation with Israel until his
position in Lebanon has improved.
Indeed, Hezbollah used Israel's acquiescence to a
prisoner swap in June 2008 to try to bolster its
domestic position and to rebuild its reputation
in Lebanon. However, critics in Lebanon pointed
out the terrible price Lebanon paid for this deal
during the 2006 war.[24] Moreover, the U.S. and
European efforts to resume negotiations on the
question of the Shebaa Farms raised Hezbollah's
fears that any deal would make it difficult to
use the conflict with Israel to reestablish
itself in Lebanon and in the Arab Middle East. It
is not surprising that Hezbollah spokesmen both
expressed reservations over any new deal and
promised to continue the struggle with Israel
regardless of whether Jerusalem returned Shebaa Farms to Lebanon.[25]
Nasrallah's War on Beirut
On November 9, 2006, the Amal and Hezbollah
ministers serving in the government of Lebanese
prime minister Fouad Siniora submitted their
resignations in protest over the refusal of the
Cedar Revolution coalition to submit to the
demands of the Shi‘i organizations to establish a
national unity government in which the Shi‘i
representation would be increased and in which
Michel Aoun, Hezbollah's loyal ally, would also
be given representation.[26] On the face of it,
these looked like innocent, and even legitimate,
demands aimed at advancing dialogue and
understanding between the various Lebanese
communities and wielders of power. However, if
these demands were met and Nasrallah's
representatives and allies received a third of
the portfolios in the Lebanese government, then
they would acquire veto power over any resolution
the Lebanese government tried to adopt.[27]
During the two years that followed, Lebanon found
itself mired in a crisis that paralyzed the
entire political system. The trauma of the
lengthy civil war that ended with the 1989 Ta'if
agreement continues to play an important role in
the public's consciousness. It impelled both
Nasrallah and his opponents to act with restraint
so as not to be perceived as responsible for the
decline of the state into a new civil war, which
would surely lead to a loss of support from their followers.
Lebanese president Emile Lahoud's term of office
ended on November 24, 2007, and for many weeks
afterwards, Lebanese politicians could not agree
on Lahoud's successor. Matters were complicated
by the speaker of the parliament, Nabih Berri,
who exploited his authority to prevent parliament
from convening to elect a president.[28]
During the first months of 2008, all efforts to
resolve the crisis and bring about the election
of a new president failed. In the meantime,
tensions between the rivals increased to the
breaking point. Hezbollah-aligned unions declared
a strike while the government adopted a
resolution to dismiss Wafiq Shuqayr, Beirut
airport's chief security officer, known for his
close relations with Hezbollah, and to close down
Hezbollah's independent communication network.[29]
Hezbollah considered the Siniora government's
decision an unacceptable challenge, or as
Nasrallah put it, as a declaration of war against
the movement.[30] Hezbollah thus decided to break
the stalemate in Lebanon and to try to force on
its enemies a solution to the crisis that would strengthen its own standing.
On May 8, 2008, Hezbollah supporters took over
the Sunni suburbs of West Beirut. Alongside the
occupation of West Beirut, Hezbollah men took
over the West Beirut offices of the Al-Mustaqbal
party led by Said al-Din al-Hariri and shut down
its television and radio stations in addition to
setting fire to the building housing the party's
newspaper, Al-Mustaqbal, which belongs to the
media empire run by the Hariri family. In
addition, Hezbollah, in a show of force,
surrounded the residencies of Hariri and Walid
Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze community.[31]
This was an impressive demonstration of the
military might of Hezbollah, but most Lebanese
already acknowledged the military superiority of
Hezbollah over all its rivals, including the
Lebanese army. Hezbollah's move was calculated
and cautious: In order to signal that they did
not wish the destruction of the Lebanese
political system, Hezbollah supporters did not
appear in uniform as organized forces and avoided
attacking government buildings or clashing with
the Lebanese army.[32] Indeed, in a matter of two
days Hezbollah evacuated their positions and left
the streets of West Beirut, enabling the Lebanese
army to deploy its forces there.[33]
But Hezbollah's impressive victory over its
rivals was pyrrhic. The challenge facing
Hezbollah is not and never has been the
occupation of West Beirut. Its challenge is to
win the hearts of the Lebanese people, especially
those who are not part of the Shi‘i community.
Those Lebanese who regarded Hezbollah with
mistrust and resentment now regard it with
hatred. Fouad Siniora discovered that in his
weakness there is much strength and that his
unwillingness to fight Hezbollah militarily won
him the support and empathy of many in Lebanon
and in the Arab world at large.[34] Many Lebanese
noted that while Hezbollah had refrained from
firing a single bullet at Israel since the end of
the 2006 war, it had turned its weapons on
Lebanese in West Beirut, an event more in the
interest of the Iranian government than that of
the Lebanese people, regardless of sectarian
preference or political outlook.[35]
The May 2008 violence, which cost the lives of
more than one hundred Lebanese, shows that no one
in Lebanon has an interest in a renewed civil
war. It was only a few days before an Arab
reconciliatory effort began, which led to an
all-Lebanese summit in Doha, Qatar. On May 23,
2008, the summit produced the Doha agreement,
which enabled the election of Michel Suleiman as
Lebanese president two days later. Other parts of
the agreement dealt with the establishment of a
unity government, in which the opposition headed
by Hezbollah would have one third of the seats
and thus the power to veto all government
decisions, and understandings regarding the
election law for the forthcoming 2009
parliamentary elections.[36] The total break has
thus been delayed until the next time.
Lebanon has weathered the struggle over the
identity of the president and is now facing the
struggle over the composition of the government.
But it also must face the yet-to-come struggle
over the parliamentary elections scheduled for
spring 2009. Altogether, these flash points
should be viewed as a prelude to the much more
significant struggle over who is to rule Lebanon
and what Hezbollah's role in Lebanon will be.
Conclusions
As time passes, the severity of the blow suffered
by Lebanon and its people from the 2006
Israel-Hezbollah war becomes clear. The war
resulted in a political crisis in Lebanon that
continues to threaten to deteriorate into civil
war, this time between the Shi‘i community and
the country's other groups. True, the war did not
engender this crisis; its roots lie in deep,
long-term problems that have been unfolding in
Lebanon for some time. However, there is no doubt
that the war intensified existing tensions,
exposed wounds that had scabbed over only with
great difficulty, and created new political and social resentments.
Precisely because the Shi‘a will become the
majority in Lebanon within a few years, the power
struggle between Hezbollah and the Amal movement
for primacy among the Shi‘a is of the utmost
importance. Surveys conducted in Lebanon shortly
after the end of the war indicate support of up
to 65-70 percent among Shi‘a for Hezbollah under
Nasrallah's leadership. However, the same surveys
also show that the organization's hard-core
supporters comprise no more than 25-30 percent of
the community.[37] This means that most of the
members of the Shi‘i community are not
necessarily in Nasrallah's pocket, and they might
transfer their allegiance from Hezbollah to Amal
if Amal can offer them the same hope that
Hezbollah once embodied. The Amal movement
believes in the integration of the Shi‘a into
Lebanese life[38] while Hezbollah represents a
radical outlook imported from Iran. Though the
economic aid that Iran provides Hezbollah has
allowed the organization to become a leading
force within the Lebanese Shi‘i community, an
internal Shi‘i conflict between Amal and
Hezbollah has by no means been averted.
Thus, in several respects, Hezbollah and its
leader find themselves in deep trouble, fighting
a rearguard action in order to maintain
themselves and regain the status they enjoyed on
the eve of the 2006 war. However, no one should
think that the organization or its supporters are
going to disappear. They will continue to be a
permanent factor in the Lebanese equation. The
challenges presently facing the organization are
not simple, nor are the challenges facing
Nasrallah. For him, Hezbollah is his life's work,
yet he has gotten the organization into deep
trouble by his badly calculated gambles. Once a
gambler, always a gambler; it is likely that
Nasrallah will take risks again and, again, make big mistakes.
Still, the real challenge seems to be the one
confronting the Lebanese state: How will the
government, along with the various Lebanese
communities, deal with the Shi‘i community? Will
they work to enable that community to live in
dignity and integrate more fully and justly into the Lebanese system?
Hezbollah will remain the most powerful force in
Lebanon. But it is weaker and more vulnerable
than many Israeli or Western officials admit.
Since the 2006 war, Hezbollah has become more
aware of its limits and weakness. It is more
careful, calculating, and prepared to gamble on
the demographical changes that will eventually
give it victory in the internal struggle for
control of Lebanon. For the time being, it is
keeping the border with Israel quiet and prefers
to play its winning card—a sophisticated
propaganda machine—that has given Hezbollah a
victorious image time and again in the past.
Where does this all take Lebanon? The answer to
this question depends on the other Lebanese
actors, some of whom, like Michel Aoun, are
cooperating with Hezbollah for short term
tactical gains, and on regional and international
actors, who have failed until now to confront
Hezbollah and to use its weakness to the advantage of Lebanon and the Lebanese.
Western officials do have a winning card to play,
however. By revealing the organization's weakness
and its failures, they can begin to neutralize
Hezbollah's propaganda machine and begin to
puncture inflated Arab and Lebanese perceptions
of Hezbollah, the first steps necessary to
neutralizing the threat it poses to Lebanon and to regional stability.
[1] Al-Manar television (Beirut), Feb. 13, 2008;
Al-Jazeera television (Doha), Feb. 13, 14, 2008.
[2] Al-Nahar (Beirut), Nov. 9, 2006. For more on
Hezbollah's role in Lebanon, see Ahmad Nizar
Hamzeh, In the Path of Hezbollah (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2004), pp. 44-79;
Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, The Changing Face
of Terrorism (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), pp.
43-110; Hala Jaber, Hezbollah, Born with a
Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press,
1997), pp. 145-68; Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah,
Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press,
2002), pp. 16-33; Na‘im Qasim, Hezbollah,
Al-Minhaj, at-Tajruba, al-Mustaqbal (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 2002), pp. 298-321.
[3] Hasan Nasrallah, interview in Al-Ra'y al-‘Amm
(Kuwait), Dec. 27, 2004; Al-Manar, Jan. 4, 2004.
[4] Asharq al-Awsat (London), Aug. 22, 2006, May
11, 2008; Al-‘Arabiya television (Dubai), May 7, 2008.
[5] Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), Jan. 12, 2008, Asharq al-Awsat, Jan. 13, 2008.
[6] Al-Manar, Feb. 6, 2008.
[7] Al-‘Arabiya, May 16, July 21, 2008;
Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), July 12, Aug. 18, 2008.
[8] Ha'aretz, May 26, 2000; Yedi'ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), Oct. 8, 2000.
[9] Daniel Sobelman, New Rules of the Game,
Israel and Hezbollah after the Withdrawal from
Lebanon (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 57-74.
[10] Al-Manar, Aug. 27, 2006.
[11] Reuters, Sept. 12, 2006; Al-Hayat (London),
Sept. 13, 2006; "Country Report—Lebanon," The
Economist Intelligence Unit, no. 4 (2006), pp. 3-6.
[12] MSNBC, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14953453/>Sept. 22, 2006.
[13] Yedi'ot Aharonot, July 15, Aug. 6, 2006.
[14] Al-Manar, July 14, 2008; Ha'aretz, July 16, 2008.
[15] Al-Manar, Aug. 27, 2006.
[16] See Hasan Nasrallah's remarks on Nasser,
Al-Mustaqbal television (Beirut), Aug. 13, 2005;
Al-Jazeera, Sept. 22, 2006, July 12, 2007.
[17] Hamzeh, In the Path of Hezbollah, pp. 44-79.
[18] Yedi'ot Aharonot, July 14, 2007; "Country
Report—Lebanon," The Economist Intelligence Unit,
no. 4 (2006), pp. 3-8; Yoram Schweitzer, "Divine
Victory and Earthly Failures: Was the War Really
a Victory for Hizbollah," in Shlomo Brom and Meir
Eliran, eds., The Second Lebanon War: Strategic
<http://www.amazon.com/Second-Lebanon-War-Strategic-Perspectives/dp/9657425026/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1225126776&sr=8-1>Perspectives
(Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007), pp. 123-34.
[19] Al-Manar, Aug. 27, 2006.
[20] Amos Harel and Avi Issascharoff, Korey
Akavish, Sipura shel Mmilchemet Levanon (Tel
Aviv: Yedi'ot Aharonot, 2008), pp. 179-81.
[21] Lebanese National News Agency, Aug. 19, Dec.
17, 2006; Yedi'ot Aharonot, Aug. 15, 2007.
[22] Harel and Issascharoff, Korey Akavish,
Sipura shel Mmilchemet Levanon, pp. 443-5.
[23] See, for example, "Evaluation of 24 Days of
Zionists' Invasion of Lebanon," Fars News Agency
(Tehran), <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8505150436>Aug. 6, 2006.
[24] Al-Mustaqbal, June 30, 2006.
[25] Al-Manar, July 1, 2008.
[26] Al-Nahar, Nov. 9, 10, 15, 2005; Al-Mustaqbal, Nov. 17, 2006.
[27] Lebanese National News Agency, Feb. 5, 6,
Nov. 9, 2006; Reuters, Nov. 13, 2006; Al-Manar, Nov. 15, 20, 2006.
[28] Al-Mustaqbal, Nov. 24, 27, 2007; As-Safir
(Beirut), Nov. 27, 2007; Reuters, Dec. 12, 13, 2007.
[29] Lebanese National News Agency, Aug. 6, 7, 2008.
[30] Al-Manar, May 7, 2008.
[31] Al-Jazeera, May 8, 9, 2008.
[32] Al-Jazeera, May 8, 2008; Al-Nahar, May 9, 2008.
[33] Al-Manar, May 9, 10, 2008; Al-Nahar, May 10, 11, 2008.
[34] Asharq al-Awsat, May 10, 2008; Al-Ahram (Cairo), May 9, 10, 2008.
[35] Al-Jazeera, May 8, 2008; Asharq al-Awsat, May 9, 2008.
[36] Al-Nahar, May 23, 25, 27, 2008.
[37] Al-Akhbar (Beirut), Sept. 20, 2006; Al-Nahar, June 11, 2008.
[38] Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a:
Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1987), pp. 71-83;
idem, Hezbollah (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2007), pp. 32, 42-6, 110-11.
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