Date:Sun, 29 Apr 2007 12:45:16 +0300
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TEL AVIV NOTES - "Hamas and the Palestinian Unity Government"
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Editor: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman April 29, 2007
Hamas and the Palestinian Unity Government:
Between the Exigencies of Government and Ideological Principles
Ephraim Lavie
The recently-established Palestinian national unity government did not
stem from a broad social and political consensus between Hamas and
Fatah. Rather, it was the product of a common interest between the
President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), and
the Hamas leadership (both in Damascus and within the PA), who feared
that Palestinian society was heading towards civil war and anarchy, and
thus acted to bring a halt to the escalation of intra-Palestinian
violence. The result was the Mecca Agreement of February 9, 2007,
which served as the basis for the unity government's platform. Its
fundamental guidelines included an indirect recognition of Israel, via
"respect" (ihtiram) for past agreements between the PLO and Israel, as
distinct from "commitment" (iltizam) to them; a willingness to establish
a Palestinian state within the June 4, 1967 borders (i.e. the West Bank,
including Arab Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) within the context of a
political agreement; insistence on the right of return of Palestinians
to their lands and properties; a ceasefire with Israel in the Gaza Strip
and a commitment to expand it to the West Bank, on the basis of
reciprocity; and an emphasis on the legitimacy of resistance to
occupation, in accordance with international law. Hamas retained the
main social portfolios in the government, including Education, Labor and
Economy, in addition to the Ministries of Religious Affairs and
Communications. Hamas also promised to continue its efforts in the
da`wa field (promoting religion), which includes the activities of
charitable organizations, mosques and community centers, institutions
which serve as the core of the movement's efforts to promote a return to
Islamic values and widen its influence in society. In return, Hamas
agreed to give up control of three important ministries Treasury,
Foreign Affairs and Interior, and to placing the treasury and foreign
ministries in the hands of individuals acceptable to the West.
Hamas' altered position constituted a significant move by the external
leadership in Damascus towards the position of Hamas officials within
the PA. Over the last year, the latter had demanded that Hamas adopt a
more realistic policy which would pave the way to stabilizing its rule
and enable it to begin rehabilitating the PA's governing institutions,
society and the economy. The external leadership, on the other hand,
had advocated the continuation of the armed struggle and not submitting
to the international boycott, believing that this would enhance public
support for Hamas. At the same time, the Hamas leadership was well
aware of the supreme national importance that Abu Mazen attributed to
the need to halting Israel's unilateral measures regarding the conflict,
and thus preventing it from determining its borders on its own. Were
Israel to succeed in doing so, went Abu Mazen's thinking, the chances of
achieving a two-state solution that would also be acceptable to the
majority of the Palestinian public would be sabotaged..
Since the establishment of the unity government, Abu Mazen has sought to
achieve its recognition by the Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the
UN), even if Hamas only indirectly recognizes Israel's right to exist.
His objective is to mobilize the international community's support, and
that of the so-called Arab Quartet (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the
UAE), in order to force Israel to accept the Arab peace initiative. In
doing so, Abu Mazen is attempting to take advantage of the American and
Israeli interest in renewing the peace process. Hence, he joined hands
with the Saudis, linking the Mecca agreement and the founding of the
unity government to the Arab peace initiative, which Arafat had
originally accepted in March 2002. Saudi Crown Prince (now King)
Abdallah's efforts at formulating the initiative had been welcomed at
the time by the UN Security Council (Resolution 1397), and it was also
mentioned favorably in the Road Map alongside Resolutions 242 and 338 as
a basis for a future settlement.
According to this initiative, peace and normal relations would be
established between Israel and the Arab states; the latter would
proclaim an end to the conflict in return for Israel's withdrawal to the
June 4, 1967 borders and the acceptance of a just and agreed-upon
solution to the refugee question in accordance with UN Resolution 194.
In this way, Abu Mazen would pose to both Israel and Hamas the challenge
of a peace agreement and the establishment of normal relations, in
return for the end to the occupation and the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state with permanent and recognized boundaries.
For its part, the Hamas leadership has now been compelled to maneuver
between (a) the obligation of governing, which require it to tender
pragmatic policies in both foreign and domestic affairs, and (b) its
determination to avoid returning to the slippery slope of the Oslo
process, which led to the PLO's incorporation within the PA and focused
the Palestinian problem exclusively on the West Bank and Gaza regions.
The exigencies of governing and the sense of responsibility for
preserving national unity, preventing civil war and reestablishing
orderly government all led the Hamas leadership, however unwillingly,
down the road towards compromise. It was forced to look the existing
reality in the eye, and acknowledge the international legitimacy of the
resolutions which underpinned the Oslo process; accept the collective
Arab legitimacy, evidenced by its assent to the Arab peace initiative;
and recognize the authority of Abu Mazen, as Chairman of the PLO,
particularly his right to renew negotiations with Israel for achieving a
political settlement. On the other hand, the path of compromise
required the movement's leadership to stubbornly defend its principles,
most importantly the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and the
claim to represent all portions of the Palestinian people. It is in
this context that one should view Hamas' intention of gaining control of
the PLO and restoring it to its past stature as representative of the
entire Palestinian people, including those in the diaspora and the
refugees.
Hence, the Hamas leadership promised to impose important restrictions in
the negotiations with Israel that would ensure no deviation from its
principles. Those restrictions are anchored in the text of the founding
principles of the unity government, according to which the negotiations
will be based on the principles embodied in the Palestine National
Council's declarations of November 1988; the "document of national
understanding" (based on the "prisoners' document"); and relevant UN
resolutions, particularly those that are deemed to guarantee the right
of return. Additional limitations include both the stipulation that any
political agreement must be approved by the Palestinian people,
including those in the diaspora, and the recent reconfirmation of the
Arab peace initiative by the Riyadh Arab Summit resolutions (March
2007), which rejected the settlement of refugees in their current place
of residence (tawtin).
The Hamas leadership thus reconciled the contradiction between its stand
on immediate pressing issues, contained in the commitment to a
continuing ceasefire and an open willingness to countenance a political
settlement, and its goal of returning the interests of the Palestinian
diaspora and refugees to the center of the official Palestinian
position. The leadership's relinquishment of government ministries and
modification of its political positions without conditions or guaranteed
benefits exposed it to public criticism. At the same time, in its more
practical approach, Hamas aspires to inscribe in the consciousness of
the international community and Arab states that Hamas is a legitimate
political movement, one which is prepared to accept a political
settlement based on the principle of a two-state solution. To a certain
extent, it has already succeeded in doing so.
Attention!
One can now view the following lectures by Professor Bernard Lewis on
the the Dayan Center Website <www.dayan.org <http://www.dayan.org/> >
(Click on "Lectures"):
"Orthodoxy and Heresy in Middle East Religions" (January 8, 2007);
"Islam, the West and the Jews" (January 25, 2007).
One may also view the proceedings of the Center's colloquium, "Sunna and
Shia - The Changing Balance of Power"
(in Hebrew), held on March 20, 2007.
Dr. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman
Senior Research Fellow
The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Tel Aviv University
Ramat Aviv, 69978
Israel
tel. 972-3-640-6447
fax. 972-3-641-5802
email. [log in to unmask][text/html]
